Pension Guarantees, Capital Adequacy, and International Risk-Sharing
Session III - International dynamics in pension governance, pension supervision and government protection
11.30 - 12.30 Lecture III.3 Zvi Bodie (Boston University School of Management)
Pensions are old-age income insurance contracts for households. To perform their economic function efficiently they must be safe and simple. Around the world they are supplied to households through a blend of social security, occupational pension plans, and financial intermediaries. Because pension systems are too big and important to fail, they ultimately are backed by government either implicitly or explicitly - as in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
Government regulation of private-sector pensions takes the form of capital requirements. Only the Dutch government currently takes account of the problem of mismatch risk in setting capital requirements for pension funds. This paper explores the problem of mismatch risk in pension regulation and how national governments can take advantage of new methods and markets for international risk-sharing to provide pension guarantees more efficiently than in the past.
Abstracts
- Lecture I.1 - Luis Viceira
- Lecture I.2 - Jon Exley
- Lecture I.3 - Jeremy Gold
- Lecture II.1 - Raimond Maurer
- Lecture II.2 - Matthias Weiss
- Lecture II.3 - David Blake
- Lecture III.1 - Richard Hinz
- Lecture III.2 - Keith Ambachtsheer
- Lecture III.3 - Zvi Bodie
- Lecture III.4 - Lans Bovenberg
- Key note speech - Lucas Papademos
